[TempCheck] SHU Snapshot Boost

[Baer_DAOplomats]

Proposal Title	Author(s)	Status	Type	Created
[RFP] Allocate SHU for incentivised voting on snapshot.	DAOplomats.eth (@Baer_DAOplomats)	Proposed	off-Chain	13.06.2024

Summary:

This proposal proposes the following.

Allocate 150,000 SHU for a 3-month trial run for a snapshot boost.

Motivation & Background

Voter apathy is one of the many problems DAOs face today. During the initial days, they usually see higher engagement on forums and proposals, which is followed by a decline in participation rate. DAOs from the previous cycle are experimenting with different methods, including professional delegation to governance coaxing.

Snapshot recently introduced the Boost protocol to tackle this issue. Under this protocol, authors can incentivize voters to vote on proposals. Shutter DAO currently has an average of 30 voters, with more than 70 voters voting on some proposals. Shutter DAO is part of the initial cohort of beta testers for Boost. We have been testing the Boost with test net tokens and are yet to start ‘Boosting’ with the main net assets.

Further read:

1. Introducing Boost: governance rewards made easy — Snapshot Labs
2. Snapshot Boost (beta) - Request for Feedback - Shutter DAO
3. Boost | snapshot

Specification

The strategy aims to allocate a maximum of 150,000 SHU tokens for proposals over the next 3 months.

A budget of 5000 SHU is allocated per proposal, with a maximum of 10 monthly proposals. The proposal author can decide how the boost should be structured. Snapshot currently supports a Lottery or a distribution based on voting power.

SHU allocation per post: 5000

SHU allocation per month: 50000

Unallocated tokens will not be carried over to the next and will be returned at the end of the trial.

Network of distribution.

Due to the relatively low number of tokens, DAOplomats proposes distributing them to tokens on the Optimism and Gnosis networks rather than the Ethereum L1. The funds will be allocated to a gnosis-safe on the respective networks.

Next Steps

1. Gain community sentiment in the proposed direction [Snapshot vote]

Disclaimer

No Guarantee of Results; and Limitation of Liability:

This proposal is neutrally presented based on current community sentiment.

DAOplomats is not compensated for this proposal and is not associated with any of the parties mentioned in the proposal above.

Given the evolving nature of the Defi ecosystem, we acknowledge that the proposed changes carry inherent risks and uncertainties. However, we have taken every precaution to ensure the thoroughness and viability of this proposal, and we are confident that it can yield the intended results with your support and involvement.

The author(s) and associated parties are not liable for any outcomes or damages from this proposal’s implementation or lack thereof.

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Copyright

Copyright and related rights waived via CC0.

[d0z3y]

I do not feel strongly either way (especially given the relatively low cost), however my initial instinct is that DAO members should already be incentivized to vote simply by holding the token. (Otherwise what is the point of tokens anyway!)

Whilst Boosts may encourage some people to vote, will it encourage them to actually think about the proposals (and read the forum posts etc) before voting given this is what we really want. Or will it just encourage junk votes from people who just want the free tokens?

Maybe a better option (though I realise this would be harder), is to incentivize those who have not delegated their votes to do so, along with a regular post to discord indicating which way delegates have voted. (Maybe to the price-talk channel )

[Baer_DAOplomats]

@d0z3y

however my initial instinct is that DAO members should already be incentivized to vote simply by holding the token. (Otherwise what is the point of tokens anyway!)

Token holders are not incentivised to vote just by holding the tokens. You either need to have a substantial stake in the DAO to vote, your net worth, you are employed by the DAO), or you care much for the values it has.

Take a look at the stats of Shutter 0x36 by Deepdao.

https://deepdao.io/organization/ca09aafe-0bdc-4441-92ed-164c64345f3f/organization_data/governance

[Novak]

That’s nice, Thanks for bringing this proposal @Baer_DAOplomats, as Shutter DAO already is supporting Snapshot Boost with Shielded Voting (link), it would be nice to see this feature used in practice in our community.

Both to explore more of the Shutter Application and also to stimulate our community, delegates and token holders being more active and participative.

After reading more about the booster feature, I see a potential in “Proportional Distribution”, also setting a maximum reward limit per voter to ensure a more equitable distribution and prevent any single voter from receiving a disproportionately large share of the rewards. My suggestion though (I would love to hear more members here) would be to do test different combinations and try to see their impacts.

A cool thing to do is keep track of the Governance behavior and if we are achieving the results from this new step, this can be achieved using DeepDAO dashboard or creating a Dune analytics (a POC until we have a broader Governance dashboard ) to see more about the behavior of Governance from Shutter. I would really need more time on that doing alone (if anyone wants to collaborate, I need to improve my SQL skills hehe).

Some cool references of Dune Analytics for Governance:

ENS Dune Governance Dashboard

Optimism Dune Governance Dashboard

Balancer Dune Governance Dashboard

[Baer_DAOplomats]

@Novak

After reading more about the booster feature, I see a potential in “Proportional Distribution”, …[…] and prevent any single voter from receiving a disproportionately large share of the rewards. My suggestion though (I would love to hear more members here) would be to do test different combinations and try to see their impacts.

I also want to test different combinations here. Shutter currently has two options 1, distribute proportionally or as a lotto. I’m not sure if we can eliminate specific addresses from the reward distribution.

Proportional distribution of tokens will reward the top addresses, who actually don’t need much incentive at the current level we are offering.

[Baer_DAOplomats]

I’m planning to move this temp check to snapshot on Monday.

[Baer_DAOplomats]

https://snapshot.org/#/shutterdao0x36.eth/proposal/0xd98dac4b8a10777c302075ea87983156633e165883d216e5dec11592b2e1ca70

[5pence]

I agree with the concept of incentivizing participation, but I’d rather see us incentivize delegation, not necessarily voting.

@Baer_DAOplomats - Would you mind if I ask for more specificity as to how the options will be selected or implemented, if you’ve decided?

I would support the proportional strategy because it lessens the quorum difficulty by returning SHU to active participants (even though it’s a small amount).

I wouldn’t support the lottery strategy. I don’t believe I’m convinced that governance participation should be encouraged this way.

@Baer_DAOplomats

Token holders are not incentivised to vote just by holding the tokens. You either need to have a substantial stake in the DAO to vote, your net worth, you are employed by the DAO), or you care much for the values it has.

I’m curious, it seems you’re suggesting that these motivations alone are not enough, and that to have proper governance one must incentivize above and beyond the motivations listed here by offering direct financial reward. Or is there a different intended meaning?

[Baer_DAOplomats]

@5pence

I’m curious, it seems you’re suggesting that these motivations alone are not enough, and that to have proper governance one must incentivize above and beyond the motivations listed here by offering direct financial reward. Or is there a different intended meaning?

I believe it can be boiled down to financial motives and shared beliefs, just like how and why people participate in elections and countries’ politics in the real world.

In traditional politics, you (the voter) can choose between one lousy option or the other. But in DAOs, you can try to step back and initiate a conversation to add a better one. For someone who is just voting on the snapshot, there isn’t much incentive to vote yes to every proposal. Since we are a DAO, every small decision is put to vote for every token holder.

Now, what does it take to participate? If I were to make an educated guess, I would say human sentiments will play a huge role! Ambitions and North Star.

Why is someone fighting for a particular cause? There will be a strong sense of duty or purpose in life. There is a strong ambition to achieve something (offices of power, financial benefits, etc )

In crypto, ve (3,3) model of Ohm and the cult-like following of many projects are prime examples of this.

Polkadot (arguably the biggest DAO on web3) is a prime example of financial stakeholder participation. Most voters are huge token holders actively taking part in decision-making because they don’t want to see their investment going to zero. People making proposals are the ones asking for grants or making technical upgrades (either working on or working with).

The same can be said for any other DAO in the EVM ecosystem: individuals actively putting themselves to power, people asking for funding, and the team making technical upgrades.
What we don’t have is large investors participating directly in voting due to potential implications of securities laws, which Polkadot or Cosmos don’t have to worry about. (they are arguing big and decentralised)

[184.eth]

Shutter DAO is part of the initial cohort of beta testers for Boost. We have been testing the Boost with test net tokens and are yet to start ‘Boosting’ with the main net assets.

Have any conclusions or insights been drawn so far from the boosting of testnet assets?

[Baer_DAOplomats]

Only one proposal was “boosted” since the Beta was enabled in April. There is a common thread that collects feedback.

This proposal is the first approach to collect feedback systematically.

[Baer_DAOplomats]

This proposal failed to reach the quorum
54.33% voted in favour, and 24.47% abstained from the proposal.