[RFC] Trial run a Recognised Delegate Program to improve governance participation

Thanks for taking the time to review the proposal and writing thoughtful feedback @5pence

Please check out our proposal for [RFC] Trial run a Governance Guardians Program which includes a governance faciliatator role and some of the responsibilities you have mentioned could be added to this role if you agree.

I understand your concerns about the additional administrative overhead introduced by a dedicated program manager. The intention behind the program manager role is to ensure efficiency in administering the RDP without overburdening the DAO or creating unnecessary complexity. However, I agree that simplicity is crucial, especially given that Shutter DAO does not yet have significant revenue.

In light of your feedback, one option we could consider is to reduce the scope of the program manager’s responsibilities. Rather than overseeing the entire program, this individual could simply coordinate the application and reporting processes (e.g., verifying eligibility, processing payments, providing a monthly overview) while leaving the more strategic governance tasks to the delegates themselves. This way, the program manager would act more as a facilitator than an administrator.

The alternative approach suggested sounds interesting. It would be great to identify what is valuable participation or genuine engagement, however, the classic challange with governance has always been, who decides who decides?

A similar KPI based delegate incentive structure has been adopted by Hop, AAVE, Uniswap, Optimism and Maker It is natural for such programs which incentivizes minimum participation to evolve in the DAOlandscape given the complex nature of DAO governance and the expertise it requires. While we can be idealistic of what governance should be, the reality is that there are a limited number of hobbiest who can keep the DAO going. However as we have stated in the motivation section, without incentivizeing a wide range of value aligned delegates to do the miniumums, the DAO risks being vulnerable to governance attacks by externals or be centralized to a few delegates who accumulate significant VP to effectively control the treasury while maintaining governance theatre.