This is a really interesting model.
Having participated in Moloch DAOs, I find the core idea compelling because it tries to solve for one of the biggest structural weaknesses in a lot of DAO models: finite runway and treasury depletion over time. Preserving principal and only governing yield feels like a strong direction for ecosystems that care about long-term stewardship.
I also like the effort to reduce governance churn. One slate vote per quarter is a meaningful contrast to the constant proposal flow that often creates fatigue in other DAOs.
A few things I would be curious to see pressure-tested further are the seat design, how inactive seat reclamation would work in practice, and whether slate voting compresses too many tradeoffs into a single decision. I also think a lot will depend on the durability and risk profile of the yield strategy underneath the model.
Overall, I think this kind of governance experimentation is worth exploring. That said, if parts of the model do not work in practice, the system should be flexible enough to respond quickly and adapt.